Ljuboimir Filipović has long ceased to be an analyst; he is a media contractor within regional projects whose primary line of work is the systematic production of anti-Serbian hysteria. His public appearances are formulaic, predictable, and always constructed on the same ideological skeleton: Serbia is a threat, Serbs are aggressors, Serbian identity is a “dangerous construct,” and every democratic victory of those outside his ideological matrix becomes a “return of darkness.”
Filipović’s “analytics” is, in essence, a mechanism of psychological conditioning of the audience. He uses three standard techniques:
1. Manufacturing fear – he constantly speaks of the “Greater-Serbian threat,” even though the concept is worn out and academically worthless. Fear is the main fuel for mobilizing an audience that does not think, but reacts.
2. Demonization of collective identity – every element of Serbian culture, faith, history, or political life in Filipović’s portrayals receives the label of “aggressive.” This is a classic depersonalization strategy: when a group is presented as a threat, any discrimination against that group appears justified.
3. False authority – he presents his views as “expert” and “scientifically grounded,” despite having no methodology, no research, and no academic reference. This is the psychological technique of “appeal to authority”: your word becomes proof because you wear the label of analyst—granted to you by the same media you supply with ideological material.
Filipović’s greatest political capital is not knowledge but his willingness to be an instrument. That is why his appearances contain no distance, no analysis, and no self-reflection—only fabricated narratives in which Serbia is always guilty, the Serbian people always the problem, and Western projects in Montenegro always the salvation.
For Ljuboimir Filipović, every fact is a movable category, and all history is clay that can be reshaped if it serves the current campaign. His media work is not based on truth but on the need to constantly produce antagonism—because without conflict, there is no visibility for him, no role, no platform.
Filipović lives off conflict and narrative overheating. That is why his aim is not to explain political processes but to distort them to the point where they look like a battle between good and evil in which Serbia always plays the role of the “dark force.” This is an ideological industry sold as “analysis”—but in essence, it is a propaganda service disguised in technical vocabulary.
His problem is not that he has an opinion. His problem is that he presents himself as an analyst while acting as an activist. And that under the guise of an expert, he spreads worn-out dogmas instead of analysis. And the public is finally beginning to see it.
